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Abstract 
Michael Colliery in east Fife was the largest National Coal Board (NCB) unit in Scotland when 
it closed in 1967, following a disastrous fire which killed nine miners. The NCB, operating 
within the constraints of the Labour government’s policy framework, decided not to invest 
in Michael’s recovery, although this would have secured profitable production within five 
years and access to thirty-plus years of coal reserves. This outcome, which had major local 
economic implications, demonstrates that deindustrialization is a willed and highly 
politicized process. The Labour government ignored workforce entreaties to over-ride the 
NCB’s decision and invest to bring the pit back into production, but made significant 
localized adjustments to regional policy that within a year attracted a major employer to the 
area, the Distillers Company Limited. The article relates the closure to moral economy 
arguments about deindustrialization. It shows that coal closures in the 1960s, while actually 
more extensive than those of the 1980s, were managed very differently, with attention to 
the interests of the workers and communities affected, and an emphasis on cultivating 
alternative industrial employment. 
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On 9 September 1967, at approximately 3.30 a.m., a major fire developed 300 fathoms 
below the ground at Michael Colliery in East Wemyss, on the south-east coast of Fife. Nine 
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men were killed, asphyxiated by gases released in the fire. Another 302 escaped, despite the 
ferocity of the heat and the smoke. Rescuers recovered six of the dead, but the other three 
were entombed behind a series of seals that were the only means of containing the fire. 
Trade union representatives successfully pressed the government to appoint a Public 
Inquiry.1 This was chaired by Henry Stephenson, H. M. Chief Inspector of Mines and 
Quarries, and found that the fire had been caused by spontaneous combustion of coal, 
which ignited polyurethane insulation lining on a roadway in the mine, and then a conveyor 
belt within that roadway. The fire spread through other flammables, including coal and 
timber. Stephenson recommended that polyurethane should not be used as insulation 
underground, and that all miners be fitted with self-rescuing breathing equipment, a central 
union demand in the disaster’s aftermath.2 Stephenson characterized the escape of 302 
men as a remarkable collective feat of courage, discipline and responsibility.3 
Michael was not the worst coal industry disaster in Scotland after 1945. At 
Knockshinnoch in east Ayrshire thirteen men died in 1950, buried when a peat valley 
collapsed into the mine, although 116 of their comrades were saved, and in 1959 at 
Auchengeich in Lanarkshire forty-seven miners were killed by a catastrophic fire.4 Both 
Knockshinnoch and Auchengeich continued operating after their fatal accidents, but the 
                                                             
1 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), POWE 52/202, Lawrence Daly, National Union of 
Mineworkers Scottish Area (hereafter NUMSA) General Secretary, to Ray Gunter, Minister of Labour, 
19 September 1967. 
2 Scottish Miner, October 1967, 1. 
3 Ministry of Power, Fire at Michael Colliery, Fife. Report on the causes of, and circumstances 
attending, the fire which occurred at Michael Colliery, Fife, on 9th September 1967, by H. S. 
Stephenson, H. M. Chief Inspector of Mines and Quarries, Cmnd. 3657 (HMSO, 1968), 2, 10, 16-17. 
4 Miles K, Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries. An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the 
Nationalised Era (Edinburgh, 2006), 70-1, 83-4, 170-1. 
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human disaster at Michael was followed by the dire economic and social consequence of 
closure, announced by the National Coal Board (NCB) on 21 November.5 Michael was the 
largest colliery in Scotland, producing 5-6 per cent of the NCB’s annual Scottish output. Its 
workforce of 2,184 men amounted to a twentieth of NCB manpower in Scotland and a fifth 
of the local employment exchange area’s insured adult male population.6 Michael’s annual 
wage bill was reckoned by Labour mining MPs to be around £3 million, and its closure would 
have significant multiplier effects as local supply firms paid out roughly the same to their 
employees.7 
The social costs of closure were also emphasized by mining union officials. Michael 
McGahey, President of the National Union of Mineworkers Scottish Area (NUMSA), asked 
Willie Ross, Secretary of State for Scotland in Harold Wilson’s Labour government, to 
contemplate the damaging long-term effects of ‘redundancy and emigration’ in 
communities across east Fife.8 The NUMSA was pushing the government to reverse the 
closure by financing Michael’s rehabilitation as a coal producer. NCB officials in Scotland 
estimated that this would cost £4 million, securing 1,500 jobs, and wanted it to happen. But 
NCB officials in London reckoned the cost of recovery at £5 million, and characterized this as 
commercially-prohibitive. The London officials hinted to union representatives that Michael 
would only be saved if the government provided the necessary investment. Lawrence Daly, 
                                                             
5 National Records of Scotland (hereafter NRS), CB 260/14/1, NCB, Michael Colliery, Press Statement, 
11.30 a.m., 21 November 1967. 
6 NRS, SEP 4/2332, Board of Trade Office for Scotland, ‘Note on the Leven and Methil Employment 
Exchange Area and the Surrounding Travel to Work Area’, 13 September 1967. 
7 NRS, SEP 4/2334, Michael Colliery, Note of a Meeting held in Dover House on Thursday 4th January 
1968. 
8 NRS, SEP 4/2336, Michael McGahey to Willie Ross, 16 January 1968. 
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NUMSA General Secretary, conveyed this intelligence to Ross,9 but the possibility was 
scotched by Richard Marsh, Minister of Power. According to Tam Dalyell, a Labour MP with 
many miners in his West Lothian constituency, Marsh disliked coal mining, appalled by its 
human costs, and so promoted other forms of energy provision.10 He offered no succour to 
Michael, telling Ross that the government had no role in managing or funding individual 
pits. These were matters entirely for the NCB.11 Marsh made the same point to a delegation 
from the Scottish Trades Union Congress.12 This was disingenuous, for his Ministry had just 
published Fuel Policy, a White Paper calling for an accelerated diversification of energy 
provision in the UK, with coal’s market share to fall from 58 per cent in 1966 to 34 per cent 
in 1975, and employment more than halved, from 425,000 to 195,000.13 These targets were 
predicated on a highly optimistic reading of future Middle East politics and oil prices, 
according to senior NCB managers. Writing before the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
massive oil price increase, which reinvigorated demand for coal, Alf Robens, the Board’s 
Chairman, predicted that his industry’s output would outstrip the Ministry of Power’s 
projected estimates.14 Fuel Policy nevertheless shaped NCB thinking in 1967: Robens 
decreed that the market for Scottish coal in Scotland could be met without Michael; and 
                                                             
9 NRS, SEP 4/2333, hand-written note of phone call taken by Secretary of State (Willie Ross) from 
Lawrence Daly, NUM General Secretary, 11 December 1967. 
10 Tam Dalyell, ‘Dick Marsh’, in Greg Rosen (ed.), Dictionary of Labour Biography (London, 2001), 
381-3. 
11 NRS, SEP 4/2333, Richard Marsh to Willie Ross, 13 November 1967, and Miss M. J. Alexander, 
Scottish Office Regional Development Division, to J. Cormack, Private Secretary, Scottish Office, 15 
November 1967. 
12 TNA, POWE 52/277, Scottish TUC and Fuel Policy: Note of a Meeting held in Minister’s room at 
Thames House South, Millbank, on Friday, 15 December, 1967. 
13 Ministry of Power, Fuel Policy, Cmnd. 3428 (HMSO, 1967), 36, 71. 
14 Alf Robens, Ten Year Stint (London, 1972), 206-33. 
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Ronald Parker, the Scottish Divisional Chairman, explicitly referred to the White Paper when 
explaining the closure to union officials.15 
The NCB’s position was understandable. Cost pressures had been bearing down on 
the industry for more than a decade by 1967, as oil, gas and nuclear energy emerged as 
rivals. In the decade from 1960 coal’s share of the expanding electricity generation market 
fell from 73.7 to 46.6 per cent, and there was absolute as well as relative decline, with total 
production falling roughly from 200 million to 150 million tonnes.16 Other aspects of macro-
policy reinforced Michael’s negative prospects. Of particular relevance was the prevailing 
emphasis on economic growth, which emerged in the late 1950s.17 This privileged economic 
activities promising quicker growth, especially assembly goods manufacturing. The 
contraction of coal was therefore an explicit aim of Conservative and Labour government 
policy in the 1960s. In Scotland growth was seen as particularly contingent on ‘rebalancing’ 
the economy, which meant reducing the historical dependence on labour-intensive and 
lower-productivity ‘heavy’ industries, starting with coal.18 
The government’s approach to nationalization also influenced the NCB’s decision to 
close Michael. The Conservative government in 1961 had tightened financial constraints on 
nationalized industries and services, required to cover costs over a five-year period.19 The 
Labour government contemplated a greater emphasis on economic than financial issues, 
                                                             
15 NRS, CB 360/13/14/5, Minute of Meeting on Michael Colliery, 6 December 1967. 
16 W. Ashworth, The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 5, 1946-1982: the nationalised 
industry (Oxford, 1986), 38-9, 678-9. 
17 Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951-64 (London, 
1998), 29-33. 
18 The Scottish Economy, 1965 to 1970. A Plan for Expansion, Cmnd. 2864 (HMSO, 1966). 
19 The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, Cmnd. 1337 (HMSO, 1961). 
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and considered the introduction of marginal cost pricing.20 But a White Paper published on 
2 November 1967,21 three weeks before the NCB announced the closure of Michael, 
reiterated the inherited focus on financial targets.22 This reinforced the trend in economic 
policy more generally towards moving labour from ‘traditional’ sectors to assembly goods. 
This, in turn, was consolidated by adjustments in regional policy, the various incentives for 
businesses to locate in areas of new population or older urban settlements exhibiting slower 
growth.23 Policy in this area had been modified in the early 1960s, in Scotland partly under 
the pressure of assembly goods manufacturers, who sought encouragement for territorial 
‘growth points’ rather than support for ameliorating unemployment in shrinking or 
depressed districts.24 Of importance here was the 1961 Toothill Report, authored by the 
Chairman of Ferranti Scotland,25 which influenced regional policy thinking within the 
Scottish Office for the next ten years at least.26 The 1964-70 Labour governments generally 
accepted this, expanding the locus of regional policy from development districts to 
development areas, although there was a slight shift back towards managing 
                                                             
20 Jim Tomlinson, The Labour Governments, 1964-70. Volume 3, Economic Policy (Manchester, 2004), 
155-67. 
21 ‘Investing £4.6 millions a day’, The Guardian, 3 November 1967, 10. 
22 Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and Financial Objectives, Cmnd. 3437 (HMSO, 
1967). 
23 Peter Scott, ‘Regional development and policy’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds), The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Volume III, Structural Change and Growth, 1939-
2000 (Cambridge, 2004), 332-67. 
24 John Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century, 1914-1979’, in R. A. Houston and W. W. J. Knox (eds), The 
New Penguin History of Scotland (London, 2001), 467-9. 
25 Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) under the 
Chairmanship of J. N. Toothill, Report on the Scottish Economy (Edinburgh, 1961). 
26 Jim Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution. Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester, 
2008), 19-45. 
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unemployment as it worsened in 1967.27 This would be reflected in the government’s 
approach to Michael, endorsing its closure but seeking to stimulate compensatory 
employment in other sectors through localized regional policy adjustments. 
The remainder of the analysis is structured in two parts. Longer-term 
deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields after 1945 is explored first, and Michael’s 
position in the coal industry and the east Fife economy delineated. The politics of the 
colliery’s closure are then examined. The analysis, to reiterate, is of the politicized decision 
to end mining at Michael, setting aside the alternative path of investment in an important 
community resource providing up to 1,500 jobs in an area of above-average unemployment. 
For this reason the discussion leans heavily on NCB and government records, where the 
anatomy of the closure decision is revealed. 
 
 
Deindustrialization and the east Fife coalfield, 1947-67 
 
The ending of production at Michael illuminates the chronology and politicized nature of 
industrial closures in post-1945 Britain. Jonathan Meades, the English cultural commentator, 
positioned deindustrialization as a major theme in his television history of Scotland, Off-
Kilter, originally broadcast in 2009. In Episode Two of this trilogy, ‘The Football Pools Towns 
of Scotland’, Meades visited Fife. Standing in a decommissioned power station in Methil, 
four miles from the site of Michael, Meades spoke about the ‘high modernism’ of its design, 
                                                             
27 Tomlinson, Economic Policy, 85-7. 
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from the mid-twentieth century, when ‘there was coal mining and there was industry that 
depended on coal mining, and there was hope’. Such industry disappeared in the closing 
decades of the twentieth century or rather, he emphasized, it ‘was made to disappear’, the 
deliberate consequence of economic policy, guided by Margaret Thatcher, Conservative 
Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, and her various allies in government, business and 
society.28 
Meades was not alone in associating deindustrialization in Scotland – and the UK 
more broadly – with Thatcherism.29 In much of the literature there is emphasis on how 
industrial closures were the consequence of the Thatcher governments’ policies, and the 
severe economic and social consequences for localities structured around industry. The 
coalfields were especially affected, with the year-long strike of 1984-5 an unsuccessful 
attempt to prevent a programme of pit closures, directed by the NCB but clearly within the 
terms of Conservative government policy. The subsequent loss of employment and income 
hastened the ‘oblivion’ of many coalfield communities, argues Owen Jones, whose 
discussion of the marginalization of the working class in contemporary Britain embodies 
what might be termed a ‘catastrophist’ analysis of deindustrialization,30 emphasizing its 
                                                             
28 Jonathan Meades, Off-Kilter, ‘The Football Pools Towns of Scotland’, originally broadcast BBC 4, 9 
p.m., 23 September 2009. 
29 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000 (London, 1999), 591-9; Richard Finlay, Modern 
Scotland, 1914-2000 (London, 2004), 341-51; David Hall, Working Lives. The forgotten voices of 
Britain’s post-war working class (London, 2012), 1-10, 327, 359-61 373; Christopher Harvie, No Gods 
and Precious Few Heroes: Twentieth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1998), 164; Arthur Marwick, A 
History of the Modern British Isles, 1914-1999 (Oxford, 1999), 290-4; Kenneth O. Morgan, The 
People’s Peace: British History, 1945-1990 (Oxford, 1992), 445-9, 466-7. 
30 Owen Jones, Chavs. The Demonization of the Working Class (London, 2012), 35-7, 48-9, 54-5, 188-
9. 
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sudden and rapid dimensions. There were clearly major losses of industrial employment in 
the 1980s, but deindustrialization in Britain preceded Thatcherism. It was also an 
international phenomenon, experienced by all OECD countries in the final third of the 
twentieth century, with substantially ambiguous causes, characteristics and consequences.31 
Hence the importance of exploring developments across the twentieth century, as a 
growing body of scholarship on the USA and Canada demonstrates.32 Deindustrialization in 
Scotland, while escalating in the 1980s, evolved gradually from the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.33 
The phrase used by Meades, ‘made to disappear’, is nevertheless apposite, 
highlighting agency and the role of politicians, employers and investors. As Barry Bluestone 
and Bennett Harrison wrote in 1982, analysing manufacturing closures in the USA, 
‘deindustrialization does not just happen’.34 The case of the Scottish coalfields demonstrates 
the deliberately managed nature of industrial contraction, which developed from the late 
                                                             
31 Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (London, 2010), 88-101. 
32 Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York, 2001); 
Steven High, Industrial Sunset. The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto, 2003); 
Sherry Lee Linkon and John Russo, Steel-town USA: Work and Memory in Youngstown (Kansas, 
2003). 
33 Ewen A. Cameron, Impaled Upon A Thistle: Scotland Since 1880 (Edinburgh, 2010), 236-44; W. W. 
Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh, 1999), 254-
64; C. H. Lee, Scotland and the United Kingdom: the economy and the Union in the twentieth century 
(Manchester, 1995), 58-70; John MacInnes, ‘The Deindustrialisation of Glasgow’, Scottish Affairs, 11 
(1995), 73-95; G. C. Peden, ‘A New Scotland? The Economy’, in T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Scottish History (Oxford, 2012), 652-70; Andrew Perchard, ‘“Broken 
Men” and “Thatcher’s Children”: Memory and Legacy in Scotland’s Coalfields’, International Labor 
and Working Class History, 84 (2013), 78-98. 
34 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America. Plant Closings, 
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York, 1982), 15. 
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1950s, although not in a linear way.35 There were three distinct phases, following a post-
1945 peak of employment in 1957: restructuring and radical shrinkage, between 1958 and 
1967, when employment dropped from 81,000 to 32,000, and annual output fell from 19 
million to 13.5 million tonnes; relative stabilization to 1977, when employment dipped to 
21,000 and production to 10.5 million tonnes; and then accelerated contraction to 1987, 
with employment down to 6,000 and production to 2.5 million tonnes.36 This experience 
was distinct rather than unique. Coal industry employment contracted across OECD 
countries from the 1960s to the 2000s, although in some cases – Germany, most notably – 
the rate of decline was slower than in Scotland. The ‘ending’ of the industry was also 
managed differently elsewhere. In France and Germany the earnings of miners made 
redundant in the final decades of closure were protected, with significant public investment 
programmes to generate alternative employment and economic activity in the coalfields.37 
In Scotland and the UK more broadly coalfield deindustrialization was managed carefully in 
the 1960s and 1970s, with communal economic security maintained via regional policy, but 
this approach was abandoned from the 1980s onwards. Engrained economic and social 
                                                             
35 Jim Phillips, ‘Deindustrialization and the Moral Economy of the Scottish Coalfields’, International 
Labor and Working Class History, 84 (2013), 99-115. 
36 The annual employment and production data is from Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries, 20. 
37 ‘France ends coal mining with tears but not a single protest’, The Independent, 24 April 2004, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-ends-coal-mining-with-tears-but-not-a-
single-protest-561039.html, accessed 24 October 2014; ‘End of an Industrial Era: Germany to Close 
its Coal Mines’, Spiegel Online International, 30 January 2007, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/end-of-an-industrial-era-germany-to-close-its-coal-mines-a-
463172.html, accessed 24 October 2014. 
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deprivation in the former coalfields of Scotland, England and Wales in the 2010s is the 
result.38 
The phased nature of coalfield deindustrialization in Scotland was shaped by four 
connected factors: rising cost pressures facing the coal industry, with mechanization and 
industrial concentration from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s; the growth of alternative 
industrial employment, mainly in the 1960s; the miners’ ‘militant’ political response to the 
initial phase, resisting further closures from the late 1960s to the 1970s; and then the re-
assertion of managerial authority in a much changed political and industrial environment in 
the early 1980s, which weakened labour’s capacity to resist a new wave of contraction. The 
process was mediated by the moral economy of the Scottish coalfields. This was distinct 
from other moral economy types identified in recent literature. Tomlinson, for instance, has 
shown that policy-makers in the 1950s and 1960s, guiding capital and labour into higher 
added value and export-based manufacturing industries, framed their priorities in moral 
terms. Workers’ rights to economic security were balanced against their obligations to 
accept employment in more profitable sectors.39 Marquand has identified a succession of 
predominant moral economy models over time, including a mid-twentieth century 
‘solidaristic’ variant, not dissimilar to Tomlinson’s, which was shared by social democratic 
and middle way Conservative policy-makers, but superseded from the 1980s by the 
                                                             
38 Mike Foden, Steve Fothergill and Tony Gore, The State of the Coalfields: economic and social 
conditions in the former mining communities of England, Scotland and Wales (Coalfields 
Regeneration Trust and Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam 
University, June 2014). 
39 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Reinventing the “moral economy” in post-war Britain’, Historical Research, 84 
(2011), 350-73. 
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contemporary ‘market fundamentalist’ approach that became embedded in the Thatcher 
years.40 
The Tomlinson and Marquand models were broadly articulated by political, social 
and intellectual elites. The coalfield moral economy, by comparison, emerged ‘from below’. 
In this respect it resembles Thompson’s famous moral economy, based on the customs and 
expectations of the English plebeian crowd, which developed from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries, and shaped collective action against profit-seeking employers and 
traders.41 The coalfield moral economy evolved over a shorter time period, shaped by 
popular memories of inter-war struggles and the redistribution of wealth and esteem from 
middle to working class that applied generally in Britain during and after the Second World 
War.42 Nationalization in 1947 further stimulated moral economy thinking, partly because of 
the recurrent mismatch between structure and experience. There was joint industrial 
bargaining and consultation, but the influence enjoyed by workers and their union 
representatives was limited in the 1950s, especially in the context of accelerating pit 
closures and job losses. A crucial episode in Scotland was the NCB announcement in June 
1959 that Devon Colliery in Alloa would close. The 653 workers were to be redeployed at 
neighbouring pits but refused. Many of their number had recently transferred to Devon 
after the closure of mines in Lanarkshire, and viewed the situation as doubly unjust.43 The 
Devon men’s disquiet was shared by the 25,000 miners across Alloa, Stirlingshire and Fife 
                                                             
40 D. Marquand, Mammon’s Kingdom. An Essay on Britain, Now (Allen Lane, 2014), passim. 
41 E. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and 
Present 50 (1971), pp. 76–136. 
42 R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England, 1918–1951 (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 161. 
43 George Bolton, Interview with Willie Thompson, May 1986; copy in author’s possession. 
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who joined an unofficial strike to protest against the pit’s closure.44 This continued for 
several days and shocked union leaders as well as NCB officials. Abe Moffat, NUMSA 
President, was forced to intervene, securing an end to the strike with a promise from the 
NCB of new talks about the pit’s future.45 Devon was closed, but not until March 1960, and 
this delay allowed the workforce to be redeployed locally, without redundancies.46 
 This crisis and its outcome illuminated the terms of the moral economy approach 
that was subsequently applied to coalfield deindustrialization. Two items were emphasized: 
changes to work organization, including pit closures and job losses, had to be negotiated by 
the NCB with union representatives; and closures would only be acceptable where the 
economic security of the men affected was preserved, whether by transfer to other pits, or 
through the availability of comparably well-paid jobs in other industrial sectors.47 The moral 
economy was contested strenuously by the NCB, particularly in the early 1960s as 
mechanization gathered pace in the Scottish coalfields, although some closures were 
opposed by local managers, seeking to resist centralizing NCB Scottish Divisional leadership, 
as well as worker representatives.48 From the mid-1960s, however, the moral case for 
                                                             
44 ’27 Scottish pits now idle, The Guardian, 25 June 1959, p. 16; ‘Fords agree to talks with ETU’, The 
Guardian, 27 June 1959, p. 2. 
45 National Mining Museum of Scotland (hereafter NMMS), National Union of Mineworkers Scottish 
Area (hereafter NUMSA), Executive Committee (hereafter EC), 29 June 1959. 
46 NRS, CB 276/14, L. R. Milligan, Industrial Relations Director, National Coal Board Scottish Division 
(NCBSD), to K. G. Smith, Secretary, NCBSD, 17 June 1959, and William Summers, Alloa Area General 
Manager, NCBSD, to K. G. Smith, Secretary, NCBSD, 15 March 1960; NMMS, NUMSA, EC, 21 March 
1960. 
47 Phillips, ‘Deindustrialization and the Moral Economy’. 
48 Andrew Perchard, The Mine Management Professions in the Twentieth-Century Scottish Coal 
Mining Industry (Lampeter and Lewiston, 2007), 216-64. 
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communal security was made more assertively and effectively by a new generation of union 
officials. Chief among these were McGahey and Daly, voted onto the NUMSA executive in 
1958 and 1962 respectively. Daly was then elected NUMSA General Secretary in 1965 and 
McGahey NUMSA President in 1967, just months before the Michael disaster. Through 
opposition to deindustrialization and advocacy of significant improvements to mining wages 
they earned reputations beyond Scotland too, Daly being elected NUM General Secretary in 
1968 and McGahey NUM Vice-President in 1972.49 This new generation of NUMSA officials 
succeeded in imposing their moral economy imperatives. The NCB was pressed, for 
example, to secure through negotiation with government and the electricity-generating 
authority in Scotland the establishment of large coal-fired power stations, at Kincardine, 
Longannet and Cockenzie, which stabilized employment in the central and eastern 
coalfields.50 Moral economy arguments, it should be noted, influenced the management of 
deindustrialization more broadly within the NCB. Ashworth, the industry’s ‘official’ historian, 
showed that with closures the NCB recognised an ‘obligation to deal fairly with those whose 
livelihood was involved’. This meant lengthy advance warning and provision for alternative 
employment, even although closures in the main were concentrated in areas of relatively 
high joblessness in UK terms,51 such as central Scotland. The NCB’s attempt – under 
pressure from union representatives – to balance the pursuit of efficiency with a form of 
                                                             
49 John McIlroy and Alan Campbell, ‘McGahey, Michael (Mick), (1925-1999)’, in Keith Gildart and 
David Howell (eds), Dictionary of Labour Biography. Volume XIII (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2010), 
242-51; Jean McCrindle, ‘Lawrence Daly: Obituary’, The Guardian, 30 May 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/may/30/obituary-lawrence-daly, accessed 24 October 
2014. 
50 Robert S. Halliday, The Disappearing Scottish Colliery (Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1990), 
142-54. 
51 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, 258. 
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social justice lends credence to Tomlinson’s observation that nationalized industries 
contributed to the ‘social democratising’ of Britain after 1945. With high levels of union 
density, they were responsible and even progressive employers, enabling radical economic 
structural change with minimal human cost in the 1950s and 1960s, as hundreds of 
thousands of workers moved into private sector manufacturing and services. In this 
important sense nationalization was a success, and not the ‘failed experiment’ which 
appears in historical accounts focusing more narrowly on economic ‘performance’.52 
These employment trends, shaped by moral economy arguments, were exemplified 
by developments in east Fife, at least until Michael’s closure. At nationalization in 1947 
there were twelve pits in east Fife, clustered between the towns of Kirkcaldy and 
Buckhaven. Several were closed shortly afterwards, but employment was stable, peaking in 
1957 at the largest three: Michael, with 3,353 workers; Wellesley in Buckhaven, with 2,603; 
and Lochhead in Coaltown of Wemyss, with 841.53 At Michael the pre-nationalization 
Wemyss Coal Company had operated two shafts and workings, known as No. 2 and No. 3, 
the former established before the First World War, and the latter constructed in the 1920s, 
at a depth of 300 fathoms. From 1949 to 1963 the NCB deepened No. 2 shaft and workings 
to 430 fathoms.54 This was the area that ‘survived’ the fire in September 1967 to the extent 
that its rehabilitation was advocated by NCB officials in Scotland.55 
                                                             
52 Leslie Hannah, ‘A failed experiment: the state ownership of industry’, in Floud and Johnson, 
Cambridge Economic History, 84-111; Jim Tomlinson, 'A “failed experiment''? Public Ownership and 
the Narratives of Post-war Britain', Labour History Review, 73 (2008), 199–214. 
53 Employment data from Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries, 149, 153, 161. 
54 Guthrie Hutton, Fife. The Mining Kingdom (Stenlake, Ayrshire, 1999), 89-90. 
55 NRS, CB 360/21/1, NCB, Scottish North Area (hereafter SNA), Michael Colliery: Brief Report on 
Future Prospects, 18 September 1967. 
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 Michael’s development from 1949 was part of the broader NCB restructuring 
process, which in east Fife included two new pits: Rothes and Seafield. Rothes was the 
industrial core of Glenrothes, one of five New Towns established in Scotland after 1945 to 
relieve housing pressures in Glasgow.56 Regional incentives, being multiplied generally 
across the 1960s,57 persuaded numerous industrial enterprises to move to Glenrothes, 
including several major US firms, such as Burroughs Machines, the computer manufacturer 
which from 1971 ran a factory built at a cost to the UK government of £4 million. This was 
close to the sum estimated in 1967 as enabling Michael’s rehabilitation, to employ 1,500 
men. Burroughs promised to employ just 1,000 workers,58 although never engaged more 
than 500, before closing in 1982.59 This indicates how choices were exercised by policy-
makers: Burroughs promised greater added economic value than Michael, and was a closer 
fit with the government’s aim of securing the continued expansion of Glenrothes through 
industrial employment growth. In this connection the Board of Trade estimated in 
September 1967 that 1,065 workers were travelling to the New Town on a daily basis from 
Michael’s employment exchange area, Leven and Methil. Of these 425 were men,60 under-
lining the extent of job opportunities for women in Glenrothes. For both sexes these new 
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jobs were predominantly in manufacturing: in 1971 roughly two-thirds of male jobs and 
over half of female jobs in the town were in industrial categories.61 
Rothes Colliery had opened in 1957, with a projected workforce of 2,500 and a life of 
a hundred years. Ian Terris, author of a lively mining memoir, was one of many who moved 
to the area, encouraged by these prospects, in his case from Lanarkshire. But Rothes closed 
in 1962, troubled by geological problems and unusually heavy flooding, with employment 
peaking at 1,200. Terris later worked at Seafield, south of Kirkcaldy, where production 
commenced in 1966, and employment rapidly built up, peaking at 2,400 in 1970.62 This 
expansion ended production in central Fife, where six pits were closed between 1962 and 
1966. These were not exhausted of reserves, but workforce representatives accepted that 
the industry’s future would be more secure if the men transferred to Seafield or large pits in 
west Fife. This was the moral economy of the coalfield in operation: the changes were 
negotiated, and employment stability and continuity of earnings prioritized.63 
The same factors applied in the rundown of east Fife, specifically in the instance of 
Michael’s neighbour, Wellesley, where the geology was difficult, and coal was produced at a 
loss every year from 1951. In productivity terms, however, Wellesley was still performing 
well in 1966-7 and local managers contemplated contraction but not closure, trimming the 
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workforce from 1,200 to 750, and concentrating on easier reserves.64 At this juncture, 
however, Scottish Divisional officials decided to treble employment at Seafield, from 780 in 
the spring of 1966 to a projected 2,600 by the summer of 1967.65 Union representatives 
were persuaded to accept Wellesley’s closure and the redeployment of its workers to build 
up Seafield,66 although many also moved to Michael.67 Seafield and Michael would continue 
as the core of NCB operations in east Fife, and Lochhead was also scheduled in the summer 
of 1967 for closure within twelve months. Events at Michael prolonged its life until March 
1970, when most of its workers moved to Seafield, with the remainder bound for Frances, 
east of Kirkcaldy. This was another pre-nationalization pit that survived the 1960s because 
of Michael’s closure.68 
 Industrial restructuring increased the relative importance of Michael, although it 
experienced intermittent difficulties. In 1965 there was a production shortfall. NCB officials 
ascribed this to inefficient worker performance, while union representatives argued that 
managers were paying insufficient attention to machine maintenance and supply, and not 
attending or taking seriously the local joint industrial consultation committee. This, they 
claimed, had inhibited the efficient operation of coal-getting, and was an important 
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transgression of the moral economy, which privileged management-worker dialogue.69 But 
Michael remained one of the NCB’s favoured fifty pits for development in 1967, with 
‘priority in recruitment, capital investment and managerial expertise’,70 and producing an 
annual average tonnage of 845,000, at an annual average profit of £445,000.71 Before the 
disaster NCB officials were projecting larger profits over thirty to forty years, with the 
enlargement of No. 3 pit operations at 430 fathoms to yield an annual average exceeding 
900,000 tonnes.72 This optimism was shared, moreover, by the Ministry of Power officials 
preparing Fuel Policy for publication in 1967. Their private prognosis was that coal 
production in Scotland by 1980 would be concentrated almost entirely on four collieries 
feeding the giant power station at Longannet, at the junction of west Fife and Clackmannan. 
All other Scottish pits would be closed, apart from Michael.73 
So Michael in the summer of 1967 was a major industrial unit with a big future, and 
of vital economic significance to East Wemyss and neighbouring settlements. The 
connection between pit and locality is worth elaborating. It had been loosened by industrial 
restructuring, with some miners and their families moving from east to west Fife, and 
further beyond. The NCB helped, arranging visits to receiving collieries, for meetings with 
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managers and union representatives, and tours of local authority housing.74 But miners had 
strong local ties which weakened the effectiveness of the transfer schemes, especially 
longer distance programmes developed by the NCB in a broadly unsuccessful attempt to 
move large numbers of men from Scotland, Northumbria and Durham to Yorkshire and the 
east Midlands.75 The bulk of redeployed Scottish miners from the late 1950s onwards 
therefore tended not to move home, but travel daily to their new pit, usually by NCB bus. 
Subsequent pit closures therefore had a different impact from those of the 1940s or the 
earlier 1950s. The localized intensity was diluted, with the workers affected typically drawn 
from a larger number of neighbouring communities. When Lochhead closed in March 1970 
some 156 face workers sought redeployment. Twenty-six lived less than two miles away, in 
West Wemyss, Coaltown of Wemyss or East Wemyss; another ninety-three lived within four 
miles, in Buckhaven, Methil, Leven, Windygates and Kennoway to the east, or Dysart and 
Kirkcaldy to the west. Only roughly two in nine, the thirty-five men from Glenrothes, 
Cardenden, Markinch or Thornton, travelled more than five miles each day. So the 
community-embedded nature of the industry was weakening, but still visible, not least in 
the family connections observable in the names of the Lochhead men. These included J. and 
T. Christie, both of West Wemyss, D. and J. Penman, and H. and J. Reekie, all of Coaltown of 
Wemyss, and G. Rodger of East Wemyss, a relative, perhaps, of R. Rodger in Coaltown of 
Wemyss.76 
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The Closure of Michael 
 
The mixture of neighbourhood connection and broader but bounded geographical 
community, evident at Lochhead in 1970, explains the intensity of the response in east Fife 
to the fire at Michael in 1967, with the accompanying threat of closure. Local anxieties were 
articulated immediately, with press reports that the pit would not re-open and 1,200 or 
more miners ‘certain’ to lose their jobs.77 ‘Bitterness and bewilderment are mounting in a 
Scots mining community suddenly thrust by disaster to the top of the national dole league’, 
sketched the Daily Record, which positioned a local feudal figure, Captain Wemyss, as the 
villain. Wemyss had allegedly obstructed the sale of nearby land for alternative industrial 
employment,78 and was a more politically convenient target for the Labour-supporting 
Record than the UK government, which responded slowly to the crisis. On 29 September 
McGahey and other members of the NUM National Executive met Harold Wilson, the Prime 
Minister, along with Marsh and Peter Shore, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The 
union delegation sought but did not receive an undertaking that the government would help 
the NCB financially to maintain the employment of Michael men who were unable to find 
other jobs.79 
The employment security of the workforce was obviously jeopardized, but NCB 
officials in Scotland were determined to preserve the pit. Ronald Parker, Scottish Divisional 
                                                             
77 NRS, SEP 4/2332, clipping, The Scotsman, 14 September 1967. 
78 NRS, SEP 4/2332, clipping, Daily Record, 10 October 1967. 
79 NRS, SEP 4/2332, Michael McGahey to Willie Ross, 3 October 1967. 
22 
 
 
Chairman, told D. J. Turner of the Ministry of Power in Edinburgh that Michael was not 
doomed,80 a private position ventilated publicly through the press.81 Local management and 
unions agreed to retain 700 men, to enable the NCB’s planned rehabilitation of the pit, with 
784 redeployed immediately in east Fife, mainly to Seafield.82 Another 500 – all those aged 
over 55 years – accepted redundancy and early retirement, along with 200 or so younger 
men, who left for other sectors. NCB Scottish Divisional officials estimated that production 
could resume at Michael within fifteen months, at a cost of £4 million. The pit would build 
up rapidly thereafter, producing over 4,500 tonnes per day and making an annual profit of 
£750,000 by 1970-71, with a workforce of up to 1,500. At this rate the £4 million would be 
repaid, including interest at 7 per cent per annum, by 1977-78.83 
This promising road to recovery was abruptly blocked in the first week of October 
when NCB officials in London insisted that redundancy notices be issued to 650 of the 700 
retained men.84 Marsh told Daly that he understood the NCB’s decision and could not 
oppose it, with the underground fire still burning and prospects for re-opening unclear.85 
Ross intervened, informing Marsh that prospects for the redundant men would be 
‘extremely poor’, and that criticism of the government as well as the NCB would now follow, 
                                                             
80 TNA, POWE 52/202, D. J. Turner, Ministry of Power, Edinburgh, Note for the record, Michael 
Disaster, 11 September 1967, and Note for the record, Disaster at Michael Pit: Employment 
Repercussions, 12 September 1967. 
81 ‘Nine men killed in pit 1,800ft below the Firth of Forth’, The Guardian, 11 September 1967, 1. 
82 NRS, CB 260/14/1, NCB, SNA, Industrial Relations Department, Michael Colliery, 18 December 
1967. 
83 NRS, CB 360/21/1, NCB, SNA, Michael Colliery: Brief Report on Future Prospects, 18 September 
1967. 
84 TNA, POWE 52/202, Clipping, ‘Dismissal for 650 Michael miners’, The Scotsman, 3 October 1967. 
85 TNA, POWE 52/202, Richard Marsh to Lawrence Daly, 11 October 1967. 
23 
 
 
for the pit had not foundered on poor worker performance or bad production results.86 Ross 
is regarded in the historical literature as a careful guardian of distinct Scottish interests 
within the UK.87 The Michael closure exemplifies the physical and social distance that he and 
other Scottish unionists were often obliged to bridge between UK policy-makers on the one 
hand and material conditions and public expectations in Scotland on the other hand. Turner 
of the Ministry of Power in Edinburgh communicated this difficulty to colleagues in 
Whitehall, emphasizing the surprise and disappointment – across Scotland broadly and 
within the Scottish Office and Scottish branches of the Board of Trade and Ministry of 
Labour – that the Michael men had been issued with redundancy notices so swiftly, ‘harshly 
and hastily’, when the future of the pit was formally undecided.88 
Michael’s closure was settled several weeks later, however, and not in Scotland. 
Reporters were briefed at the beginning of November that the decision would be taken by 
NCB officials in London, and ‘on economic grounds alone’.89 On 21 November an NCB press 
release intimated that Michael would not re-open for production after all. The cost of 
reconstruction was reckoned by the officials in London to be £5 million rather than £4 
million, and this was presented as an unacceptable commercial risk given the falling market 
for Scottish coal which could be met from other pits which would now enjoy extended lives. 
Pumping operations were maintained, to prevent flooding at nearby Frances, leaving open 
the possibility of rehabilitation if the market for Scottish coal unexpectedly grew,90 although 
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this was ruled out by NCB Finance Department officials the following spring, when 
demolition of buildings and disposal of equipment commenced.91 
This outcome had been carefully choreographed, with Ministers first establishing a 
narrative of economic optimism for east Fife. One industrial alternative had been raised by 
the NUM. McGahey synthesized his analysis of the safety lessons of the disaster with a call 
that some of the redundant could be redeployed to manufacture self-rescuing breathing 
equipment. The NUM position was that all miners should be issued with this equipment, 
which the NCB accepted in principle during the course of the Michael public inquiry.92 A 
potentially large contract for an ambitious producer with a suitable model was therefore 
emerging. In the last week of September Board of Trade officials in Scotland spoke to the 
Managing Director of Mine Safety Appliances, Ltd of Glasgow, the most prominent Scottish 
firm in the market. He was unenthusiastic about locating expanded production in Fife: a 
burst of activity to meet the NCB’s initial demand would be followed by an unprofitably 
small volume of replacement and repair work, and the manufacturing process would require 
precise engineering and quality control, implying large start-up costs in staff training.93 This 
may have been a negotiating position, however, for by mid-October there were reports of 
the firm’s willingness to move to Fife, possibly in vacant Board of Trade factories in Leven 
and Kirkcaldy.94 
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McGahey pursued this proposal and the broader economic stability of east Fife in 
direct talks with Ross on 16 October. The NUMSA President argued that Michael had a 
future as a large-scale producer and employer, and so the government should contribute to 
the costs of re-opening it, as well as improving the incentives for manufacturing firms to 
locate in the Leven area. Ross was non-committal,95 and the government did nothing to 
encourage the transfer of self-rescuer manufacturing to Fife. Ministers were nevertheless 
sensitive to criticism that regional policy in Fife – concentrating upon Glenrothes as a 
growth point – had brought limited benefits to the Leven and Methil area. The means of 
amending policy to stimulate employment closer to Michael were eventually outlined by 
Lord Hughes, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, meeting local authorities along with 
NCB and union representatives in Buckhaven on 14 November. Chief among these was the 
provision of rent-free Board of Trade accommodation for five years for firms offering 
‘suitable employment’.96 Ross and the Scottish Office had pressed Marsh and the Ministry of 
Power early in November to compel the NCB to delay its otherwise ‘premature’ 
announcement of Michael’s closure until Hughes could outline these regional assistance 
changes.97 Shore, along with Anthony Crosland, responsible as President of the Board of 
Trade for the proposed regional policy adjustments, had supported Ross, with Marsh 
securing the NCB’s agreement to postpone news of the final decision.98 This was contested 
by Michael’s workers and their trade union and local authority representatives, on 
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economic as well as social grounds. Lobbying included direct appeals to both Wilson and 
Robens,99 and joint industrial talks at Scottish Divisional level, where McGahey queried the 
rehabilitation cost of £5 million, which even as an over-estimate would be a ‘worthwhile 
investment’ given the pit’s profitability and extensive reserves of 40 to 50 million tonnes, in 
thick and easily workable seams. The damaging community effects of the closure were re-
emphasized.100 Parker, NCB Scottish Divisional Chairman, conveyed the feelings of his 
employees and the union representatives to Robens, who was unmoved, confirming 
Michael’s closure.101 
This was a major transgression of the coalfield moral economy, with the decision 
taken by managerial fiat, in direct opposition to the stated interests and ambitions of the 
workforce. All subsequent pit closures in Scotland until the early 1980s were by negotiation, 
and scheduled to coincide with, or enable, the build-up of employment at other pits. Mining 
MPs and union representatives pursued moral economy arguments in the following weeks, 
linking the closure to the Fuel Policy strategy which had shaped the NCB’s conclusion that 
falling demand could be met without Michael. McGahey urged Ross to see that further 
closures would follow, each more likely in the wake of Fuel Policy, and in areas of Scotland 
where alternative employment was in short supply, including Fauldhouse in west Lothian 
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and Knockshinnoch in east Ayrshire.102 Tom Swain, MP for Derbyshire North-East, and chair 
of the mining group of MPs, told Ross in January 1968 that Michael’s closure was an 
unwelcome ‘commercial decision arising from the Government’s policies’. The same 
meeting was attended by Alex Eadie, MP for Midlothian and one-time NUM delegate at 
Michael’s neighbour, Lochhead. From a moral economy perspective Eadie argued that 
Michael had ‘worked a rich coalfield, there was a good labour force and good industrial 
relations’. The social costs of abandoning this economic resource were immense: ‘This was 
not a depressed or depressing area’, he said, ‘and a great deal had been invested in social 
capital’, including the development of high-achieving local authority schools.103 Ross told 
the mining MPs that decisions about pit closures were taken by the NCB, and so he could do 
nothing to reverse the outcome. Ross reiterated this to union officials, led by McGahey, in 
Edinburgh in January 1968, saying that his role was confined to mitigating the effects of 
closures, chiefly through regional policy changes.104 
Union and local authority lobbying, the latter stressing the urgent necessity of 
alternative industrial employment,105 had some impact. Michael was not rehabilitated. But 
the second important tenet of the moral economy, that the economic security of the 
workforce should be guaranteed, was just about sustained. Scottish Office Regional 
Development officers reviewed the employment legacy of the disaster in October 1970. NCB 
intelligence indicated that half the workforce had been redeployed at other pits: 844 in east 
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Fife, 109 in west Fife, six in the Lothians and Ayrshire, and sixty in England. 206 men aged 
sixty and over and 303 men in the fifty-five to fifty-nine age group had received early 
retirement and access to their pensions immediately after the disaster. The remainder, 
roughly 650 men, had left the industry altogether, it was presumed to take jobs in other 
sectors.106 This latter point bears emphasis. Employment prospects in east Fife were 
relatively bleak, as Ross pointed out to his government colleagues. Yet the situation was not 
hopeless and the regional policy adjustments made by the government in response to the 
crisis had a positive effect as time went on. Unemployment in the short-term peaked in the 
Leven and Methil employment exchange area in February 1968, at 6 per cent overall, and 
7.2 per cent among males. It reached this level again in September 1970, although the 
impact of the policy changes was still being felt, with the Distillers Company Limited (DCL) 
announcing plans that month for a new blending and bottling plant in Leven. This would 
employ 900 by 1973, including 350-plus men,107 and proved to be an important long-term 
initiative, with Diageo, the corporate successor to DCL, still a significant employer in east 
Fife in the second decade of the twenty-first century, following renewed expansion in 2011-
12.108 The blending and bottling plant embodied on a local scale the broadly successful 
trend in regional policy, with Scottish Gross Domestic Product per capita increasing from 
87.7 per cent of the UK level in 1962 to 91.1 per cent in 1966-73 and then 96.0 in 1973-9.109 
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Michael’s closure was still an important economic loss in east Fife, depriving the area 
of 1,500 or more relatively well-paid manual jobs that would have been safe for perhaps 
another twenty years. Michael’s scale and potential future in 1967 are worth reiterating. It 
was the NCB’s largest Scottish unit and Ministry of Power officials predicted that it would 
out-live all others in Scotland, with the exception of those clustered around Longannet 
power station. Union representatives, moreover, were arguing that the colliery had 40 to 50 
million tonnes of reserves. Taking the lower estimate of 40 million, to be extracted at the 
NCB’s projected daily rate of 4,500 tonnes, would imply a life of thirty-five years or more 
from 1967. Coal was given a boost by the oil price surge from November 1973, and the 
election in 1974 of the Labour government which agreed with the NCB and industry unions 
the Plan For Coal, a strategy for investment and growth, reversing the contracting logic of 
Fuel Policy.110 This would have taken Michael into the 1980s, when the political economy of 
coal was transformed. The Thatcher governments imposed tight budgetary constraints on 
the industry, seeking to eliminate all units that were not making a narrowly-defined financial 
profit.111 The NCB was also encouraged to abandon joint industrial procedures and 
agreements, so that meaningful union voice on the key strategic question of closures was 
removed.112 The outcome of the miners’ defeated strike against pit closures of 1984-5 was 
an acceleration of deindustrialization.113 In this new situation Michael would probably have 
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closed within a year or two of 1985: Seafield, its nearest comparator in size and locality, did 
so in 1987. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Michael’s physical remains consist of a memorial in East Wemyss, a miniature replica of the 
head-frame of No. 3 pit, where the fatalities took place.114 The colliery was not closed by the 
fire but by conscious decisions: by government ministers and officials, when constructing 
economic, fuel, regional and nationalized industry policies; and by NCB officials operating 
within the framework of these policies. Michael had substantial reserves of coal. With 
investment of up to £5 million these could have been profitably mined, for at least two 
more decades, providing energy, significant employment, and social stability in the towns 
and villages of east Fife. Policy-makers instead favoured different paths: assembly 
manufacturing, subsidized through regional policy, because it promised greater additional 
economic value; and diversification of electricity generation, with enlarged provision in the 
energy mix of oil, gas and nuclear power. This posing of alternatives, and the conscious 
taking of decisions about investment and disinvestment, is the core conclusion to draw from 
the closure of Michael. The episode shows that deindustrialization should be conceptualized 
as a deliberate and willed human phenomenon, with decisions made by economic and 
political actors in the course of social relationships and tensions. 
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So Michael was made to disappear, and in the 1960s, rather than in the 1980s. This 
too should be emphasized. Deindustrialization generally and coal closures particularly 
preceded Thatcherism. Yet distinct circumstances applied in this earlier period of 
restructuring. Moral economy arguments emerged in response to the initial wave of 
closures and job losses in the late 1950s, and were expressed with increasing assertiveness 
by a new generation of union officials. These arguments constrained the extent and impact 
of coalfield deindustrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Michael’s closure was, in this sense, 
highly unusual, demonstrating that the workers’ moral economy was contested, by NCB 
managers and UK policy-makers. The government’s competing moral economy view, that 
workers should in some circumstances be required to move from coal and other ‘traditional’ 
sectors to higher growth manufacturing, in this instance superseded the workers’ moral 
economy claim that coal closures should only be effected with their agreement. But even in 
this atypical case the workers’ moral economy arguments were not entirely disregarded. 
The economic security of Michael’s extended local community in east Fife was defended, 
chiefly by trade union and also local authority representatives. Their pressure secured 
changes in regional policy that stimulated at least one significant new source of 
employment in the area, the DCL blending and bottling plant in Leven. Moral economy 
ideas, along with workforce and union activism, also guided the NCB’s strenuous efforts to 
provide jobs at other pits, mainly close by, for younger Michael workers. This is another 
important conclusion arising from the emphasis on policy choice and human agency: 
deindustrialization can be managed in different ways. In the 1980s coal closures were 
obtained unilaterally by the NCB, in pursuit of UK government policy aims, and in the 
context of rising unemployment and a radical decline in coalfield economic security. This 
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acceleration of deindustrialization was a more systematic and complete transgression of the 
coalfield workers’ moral economy than the closure of Michael two decades earlier. 
